Retrospective studies of horizontal mergers have focused on their price e¤ects, leaving the important question of how mergers a¤ect product quality largely unanswered. This paper empirically investigates this issue for two recent airline mergers: Delta/Northwest and Continental/United. Consistent with the theoretical premise that mergers improve coordination but diminish competitive pressure for quality provision, we …nd: (i) each merger is associated with a quality increase in markets where the merging …rms did not compete pre-merger, but with a quality decrease in markets where they did; and (ii) the quality change can be a U-shaped function of the pre-merger competition intensity.
Introduction
Retrospective studies of horizontal mergers tend to focus on the price e¤ects of a merger, and often use the price e¤ects to infer relative changes in market power and cost e¢ciencies associated with the merger. Such analyses implicitly assume that the quality of products do not change over the relevant pre-post merger periods. 1 However, price increases or decreases associated with a merger could be closely related to product quality changes. Given the importance of product quality to consumers, it would be imperative to understand the quality e¤ects of mergers. In this paper, we aim to shed light on the relationship between mergers and product quality by empirically investigating two recent airline mergers -the Delta/Northwest (DL/NW) and the Continental/United (CO/UA) merger.
To motivate our empirical study, we …rst present a theoretical model with two …rms that captures what we call the coordination and incentive e¤ects of a merger on product quality. A horizontal merger allows two …rms to share technology information and coordinate production, which can positively a¤ect the quality of their products. However, the merger also has an incentive e¤ect, as it eliminates the competitive pressure on the …rms to provide high quality. 2 This incentive effect is usually negative, but its magnitude depends on how intense the two …rms competed before the merger. While competitive pressure motivates …rms to improve product quality, the diminished pro…t under competition, especially when competition intensity goes beyond certain point, can weaken the incentive for costly quality provision. Hence, before the merger, product quality could vary non-monotonically with competition intensity, possibly maximized at some intermediate level of competition intensity. 3 Consequently, the e¤ect of a merger on quality can also be non-monotonic in pre-merger competition intensity, possibly most negative when the strength of pre-merger competition is at some intermediate point.
In markets where the two …rms have little or no direct competition prior to the merger, the coordination e¤ect dominates, so that the merger will increase product quality. As pre-merger competition is intensi…ed, the negative incentive e¤ect of the merger becomes more pronounced and dominates the coordination e¤ect. With further increases in competition intensity, however, it is possible that the incentive e¤ect diminishes, alleviating the negative quality impact of the merger. Our theoretical model thus has two testable implications: (1) a merger tends to increase (or decrease) product quality in markets where the two merging …rms had little (or substantial) pre-merger competition; and (2) the quality change due to the merger may vary non-monotonically as the intensity of pre-merger competition increases, possibly exhibiting a U-shaped relationship.
Equipped with the theoretical insights, we empirically explore how mergers a¤ect product quality from two recent airline mergers, the Delta/Northwest and the Continental/United merger, where the merging …rms produce in multiple markets. In some of the markets, the …rms did not have pre-merger competition with each other, whereas in others they competed directly, with varying degrees of competition intensity. 4 These mergers thus o¤er a proper setting for our study.
Our speci…c measure of air travel product quality is what we refer to as Routing Quality. (In Section 3, we discuss in detail why we choose this measure in light of alternative measures of quality.)
Related to travel convenience of the air travel product itinerary, routing quality is measured by the percentage ratio of nonstop ‡ight distance to the product's itinerary ‡ight distance used to get passengers from the origin to destination. Since some products have itineraries that require intermediate airport stop(s) that are not on a straight path between the origin and destination, each of these products will have an itinerary ‡ight distance that is longer than the nonstop ‡ight distance. The presumption here is that passengers …nd a nonstop itinerary most convenient to get to their destination. Therefore, the closer is the product's itinerary ‡ight distance to the nonstop ‡ight distance, i.e. higher values of our routing quality measure, the more desirable is the travel itinerary to passengers.
Our empirical analysis starts by estimating a discrete choice model of air travel demand. This serves two purposes. First, it veri…es that passengers' choice behavior is consistent with that a higher routing quality measure is associated with a more passenger-desirable travel itinerary.
Second, estimates of the pre-merger cross-price elasticities of demand between the two merging …rms, in markets where they competed directly, serve as a useful indicator of the competition intensity. We then proceed to use a reduced-form regression equation of routing quality to evaluate e¤ects that each of the two mergers have on product quality of the merged …rms.
Consistent with theory, the regression estimates suggest that each merger is associated with an increase in routing quality in markets where the merging …rms did not compete with each other prior to the merger, but with a decline in routing quality in markets where they did. Furthermore, in the case of the CO/UA merger, the change in product quality appears to exhibit a U-shaped relationship with the two …rms' pre-merger competition intensity. We also …nd that, compared to the DL/NW merger, the CO/UA merger is associated with less severe quality declines and larger quality improvements. Thus, in terms of consumer welfare e¤ects associated with product quality changes, our econometric analysis reveals evidence that on average consumers fared better under the CO/UA merger than under the DL/NW merger.
Since the deregulation of the US airline industry in 1978, there has been a number of mergers.
Empirical studies of these mergers, similar to merger studies in other industries, have focused on price e¤ects, and sometimes used these price e¤ects to infer relative changes in market power and cost e¢ciencies associated with a merger (Werden, Joskow and Johnson, 1989; Borenstein, 1990; Kim and Singal, 1993; Peters, 2006; Luo, 2011) . In case of the recent DL/NW and UA/CO mergers, Gayle and Le (2013) estimate marginal, recurrent …xed and sunk entry cost e¤ects associated with these mergers. Even though there are several studies of the airline industry that examine the relationship between service quality and market structure/competition, 5 we are unaware of studies that explicitly analyze e¤ects of mergers on air travel product quality. 6 Our paper contributes to this literature, as well as to understanding more generally how mergers a¤ect product quality.
In the rest of the paper, we provide the theoretical motivation in section 2, describe the mergers and the data in section 3, and present the empirical model in section 4. Section 5 contains the empirical results, and section 6 concludes.
5 Mazzeo (2003) , Rupp, Owens and Plumly (2006) , and Prince and Simon (2009) all …nd evidence that airlines provide worse on-time performance on less competitive routes. However, contrary to this result, Prince and Simon (2013) …nd that incumbents' on-time performance actually worsens in response to entry, and the threat of entry, by Southwest Airlines and other low-cost carriers. 6 Draganska, Mazzeo and Seim (2009) and Fan (2012) constitute important methodological contributions in using econometric models to predict how mergers may in ‡uence non-price product characteristic choices. Draganska, Mazzeo and Seim (2009) applied their merger simulation analysis to the ice-cream industry, whereas Fan (2012) applied her merger simulation analysis to the newspaper industry. However, neither study is a retrospective analysis of how non-price product characteristics actually change subsequent to a merger, which is the focus of our study.
Theoretical Motivation
A merger by two …rms allows them to share technology and coordinate production activities, which can positively a¤ect the quality of their products. We call this the coordination e¤ect of a merger.
For example, an airline merger may allow the two airlines to coordinate their ‡ight schedules to better serve consumer needs. On the other hand, a merger reduces the competitive pressure on quality improvement, which can negatively a¤ect the quality of their products. In the context of an airline merger, this could be reduced product o¤erings that lessen travel convenience. 7 We call this the incentive e¤ect of a merger. Our basic theoretical premise is that whether a merger will raise or lower product quality depends on the interaction of these two potential e¤ects. When pre-merger competition between the two …rms is weak, the coordination e¤ect is likely to dominate. Otherwise, the merger is more likely to reduce product quality.
To …x ideas, consider the following simple model. Suppose that the two …rms and their respective products are denoted as A and B. Their demand functions are, respectively:
for 2 [0; 1); where is a measure of product di¤erentiation, and v i represents the quality of product i for i = A; B. When = 0; there is no competition between the two products, whereas a higher indicates that the two products are closer substitutes, or the two …rms have more intense pre-merger competition. Notice that for > 0; the demand for product i is higher if the quality-adjusted price for the competing product, p j v j ; is higher.
Suppose that …rm i can choose v i at cost 1 3 v 3 i ; and it chooses v i and p i at the same time. 8 Under competition, the two …rms make their quality and price choices simultaneously. After merger, the merged …rm M can choose v i with cost 1 3 v 3 i ; where 2 (1=2; 1] re ‡ects the idea that M is able to coordinate its production to possibly have a lower cost for quality. Hence, a lower indicates a stronger coordination e¤ect. Other costs of production are normalized to zero. 7 For example, competing airlines in a market may each provide nonstop and intermediate stop(s) products prior to merging, but …nd it pro…table to eliminate the more travel-convenient nonstop product post-merger. 8 It is possible to extend this analysis to allow qi to be more general functions of vi; vj; pi; and pj; as well as to allow more general cost functions of providing vi. With our more restrictive functional-form assumptions, we aim to obtain closed-form solutions and to illustrate the economic forces in a most transparent way.
Under competition, the …rms' pro…t functions are:
At a Nash equilibrium, …rm i 0 s strategy (p i ; v i ) ; i = A; B; satis…es @ i =p i = 0 and @ i =v i = 0: The unique symmetric equilibrium, which solves these …rst-order conditions, give
and this is also the unique Nash equilibrium when 0:56: We shall focus on the symmetric equilibrium for the rest of our analysis.
After the merger, M chooses p A ; p B ; v A ; v B to maximize its joint pro…t from both products:
From the …rst-order conditions, @ M =p i = 0 and @ M =v i = 0; i = A; B; the merged …rm's optimal choices of price and quality are obtained as
Notice that the change in product quality due to the merger is
It follows that
That is, a merger reduces product quality in markets where the coordination bene…t is weak relative to the pre-merger competition incentive (i.e., 2 (1 ) < ), but increases product quality in markets where the coordination e¤ect dominates the competition e¤ect (i.e., 2 (1 ) > ). We summarize this discussion in the following: Proposition 1. For given 2 (1=2; 1]; a merger increases product quality when the pre-merger competition intensity is low (i.e., < 2 (1 )), but decreases quality when the pre-merger competition intensity is high (i.e., > 2 (1 )). Furthermore, the quality change from the merger,
is a U-shaped function of ; …rst decreasing and then increasing, reaching its minimum at^ = 2 p 2 : As increases, the curve is initially positive and falling, and it then becomes negative, reaching its minimum at^ = 2 p 2 , before rising again. That is, the change in product quality due to the merger varies non-monotonically in ; the measure of competition intensity between the …rms before merger. This suggests that the incentive to raise product quality under duopoly is often the highest at some intermediate strength of competition. 9 Intuitively, while competitive pressure motivates …rms to improve product quality, the diminished pro…t under competition, especially when competition strength goes beyond certain point, can weaken the incentive for costly quality provision. Therefore, the change in product quality due to a merger may be a U-shaped function of the competitiveness between the two …rms prior to the merger.
An alternate interpretation of Proposition 1 is that product quality can be higher under either a multiproduct monopoly or duopoly competition, depending on the relative sizes of the coordination and incentive e¤ects. This is related to Chen and Schwartz (2013) , who …nd that product innovation incentives can be higher under either monopoly or (duopoly) competition, depending on the balance of what they term as the price coordination and the pro…t diversion e¤ects.
To provide a clear illustration of the potential quality e¤ects of a merger, our model has made strong assumptions on the functional forms and abstracted from considerations of other possible competitors in the market (which we will control for in our empirical analysis). Despite these restrictions, we believe that the economic forces illustrated here are general, and the trade-o¤s between the coordination and incentive e¤ects, as well as their implications, will be valid in more general settings. This straightforward theoretical model thus serves the purpose of motivating our empirical analysis. Its …rst implication, that a merger increases product quality in markets where the two …rms have little per-merger competition but may reduce quality when pre-merger competition is signi…cant, does not depend on the speci…cs of the model. Its second implication, that there is a U-shaped relationship between pre-merger competition intensity and the quality change from the merger, is more likely to hinge on the speci…c functional forms we have assumed.
In light of these theoretical insights, we next turn to empirical analysis.
The Mergers and the Data
This section describes the mergers, our quality measure, and the data. The executives of the two airlines asserted that the merger will bene…t customers, employees, shareholders, and the communities they serve. 11 Moreover, they argue that the merger will help create a more resilient airline for long-term success and …nancial stability. In terms of possible e¢-ciency gains from the merger, they anticipate that cost synergies will be achieved by 2012. Bene…ts are anticipated to come from combining and improving the airlines' complementary network structure, where e¤ective ‡eet optimization will account for more than half of those network bene…ts.
The Mergers
Cost synergies are anticipated to come from the combining of sales agreements, vendor contracts, While cost e¢ciency gains are anticipated from both mergers, it is more di¢cult to predict whether the quality of products o¤ered by the newly merged …rms will be higher or lower.
Measuring Product Quality
A challenge that empirical work faces in studying the relationship between merger and product quality is to …nd reasonable measure(s) of product quality. The literature on the airline industry correctly views timeliness of service as an important dimension of air travel service quality. 13 Various papers have analyzed di¤erent aspects of timeliness. The three main quality dimensions of service timeliness analyzed in the literature are: (i) "On-time performance," measured by carrier delay time when servicing a given set of itineraries; (ii) "Schedule delay", which is a gap between a passenger's preferred departure time and actual departure time; and (iii) travel time required to complete a given itinerary in getting the passenger from the origin to destination. Studies in the literature typically measure (i) directly from available data on ‡ight delay, 14 but quality dimensions (ii) and (iii) are typically measured indirectly using data that are posited to be correlated with these quality dimensions. 15 Indirect measures of quality dimension (iii) used in the literature, which is the focus of our paper, are typically itinerary ‡ight distance-based. For example, Dunn (2008) Sickles (2007); and Gayle (2007 and 2013) .
Our speci…c measure of air travel product quality, which we refer to as Routing Quality, is the percentage ratio of nonstop ‡ight distance to the product's itinerary ‡ight distance used to get passengers from the origin to destination. Therefore, the Routing Quality variable has only strictly positive values, where the maximum value is 100 in the case that the product itinerary consists of a nonstop ‡ight. As suggested above, the presumption is that passengers …nd a nonstop itinerary most convenient to get to their destination, so higher values of Routing Quality are associated with a more passenger-desirable travel itinerary. While this seems reasonable, the structural demand model that we subsequently describe will provide empirical validation to this presumption. We believe that routing quality is one of the better measurable quality dimensions of air travel service that is more directly related to optimal choices of an airline. The task of our empirical analysis, then, is to understand how optimal integration of the merging airlines' networks in ‡uences their routing quality in a market.
Data
Data are drawn from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1BMarket) published by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The data are quarterly and constitute a 10 percent sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers. An observation is a ‡ight itinerary that provides information on: (i) the identity of airline(s) associated with the itinerary; (ii) airfare; (iii) number of passengers that purchase the speci…c itinerary; (iv) market miles ‡own in getting the passenger from the origin to destination; and (v) the identity of origin, destination and intermediate stop(s) airports. Unfortunately, the DB1B data do not contain passenger-speci…c information, or information on ticket restrictions such as advance-purchase and length-of-stay requirements; such information would facilitate estimation of a richer demand model than the one we use based on available data. Our sample has a total of 55 metropolitan areas ("cities") and 63 airports. A product is de…ned as an itinerary-operating carrier combination during a particular time
period. An example is a direct ‡ight from Dallas to Atlanta operated by American Airline. We focus on products that use a single operating carrier for all segments of the trip itinerary. In Table   2 we report the names and associated code of the carriers in our sample. An observation in the raw data is an itinerary showing airline(s), origin, destination and intermediate stop(s) airports associated with the itinerary, as well as the number of passengers that purchase this itinerary at a given price. Therefore, a given itinerary is listed multiple times in the raw data if di¤erent passengers paid di¤erent prices for the same itinerary. We construct the price and quantity variables by averaging the airfare and aggregating number of passengers, respectively, based on our product de…nition, and then collapse the data by product. Therefore, in the collapsed data that we use for analyses a product appears only once during a given time period. In order to avoid products that are not part of the regular o¤erings by an airline, we drop products that are purchased by less than 9 consumers during a quarter.
Observed product shares (denoted as upper case S j ) are constructed by dividing quantity of product j purchased (denoted as q j ) by origin city population (denoted as P OP ), i.e., S j = q j P OP . In addition to Routing Quality, we create two other non-price product characteristic variables: (i)
Origin Presence, which is computed by aggregating the number of destinations that an airline connects with the origin city of the market using non-stop ‡ights. The greater the number of di¤erent cities that an airline provides service to using non-stop ‡ights from a given airport, the greater the "presence" the airline has at that airport. (ii) Nonstop, which is a zero-one dummy variable that equals to one only if the product uses a nonstop ‡ight to get passengers from the origin to destination. There are two variables we use to measure level of competition faced by a given product in a market, possibly from competitors other than a merging airline: (i) N_comp_nonstop, which is the number of nonstop products o¤ered by an airline's competitors in the market; and (ii) N_comp_connect, which is the number of products that require intermediate stop(s) o¤ered by an airline's competitors in the market.
Summary statistics of variables used in estimation are reported in Table 3 .
The Empirical Model
In the spirit of Peters (2006), Gayle and Le (2013) , and among others, we …rst specify a discrete choice model of air travel demand. This demand model is used to empirically validate that consumers' choice behavior is consistent with our presumption that higher values of Routing Quality is associated with a more passenger-desirable travel itinerary. It also provides estimates of the pre-merger cross-price elasticities of demand between the two merging …rms in markets where they competed directly. These cross-price elasticities serve as a useful indicator of their pre-merger competition intensity. A reduced-form regression model of routing quality is subsequently speci…ed to identify the merger's quality e¤ects.
Air Travel Demand
Air travel demand is based on a nested logit model. Potential passenger i in market m during time period t faces a choice between J mt + 1 alternatives. There are J mt + 1 alternatives because we allow passengers the option not to choose one of the J mt di¤erentiated air travel products. Products in a market are thus assumed to be organized into G + 1 exhaustive mutually exclusive groups/nests, g = 0; 1; :::; G, in which the outside good, j = 0, is the only member of group 0.
A passenger solves the following optimization problem: M ax j2f0;:::;Jmtg
where U ijmt is the level of utility passenger i will obtain if product j is chosen, while jmt is the mean level of utility across passengers that consume product j. jmt is a function of the characteristics of product j, as we will describe shortly. imtg is a random component of utility that is common to all products in group g, whereas the random term " ijmt is speci…c to product j and is assumed to have an extreme value distribution.
The parameter ; lying between 0 and 1, measures the correlation of the consumers' utility across products belonging to the same group. Since products are grouped by airlines, measures the correlation of the consumers' utility across products o¤ered by a given airline. As increases, the correlation of preferences among products o¤ered by the same airline within a market increases;
hence, the closer is to 1, the more airline-loyal consumers are.
The mean utility function is speci…ed as: 
where S jmt is the observed share of product j computed from data by S jmt = q jmt P OPmt , in which q jmt is the quantity of product j purchased and P OP mt is the potential market size measured by origin city population. S 0mt = 1 X j2Jmt S jmt is the observed share of the outside option; S jmtjg is the observed within-group share of product j; and jmt is the structural demand error term.
Since Price jmt and ln S jmtjg are endogenous, we use two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate equation (6). The instruments we use for the 2SLS estimation are: (1) number of competitor products in the market; (2) number of competing products o¤ered by other airlines with an equivalent number of intermediate stops; (3) itinerary distance; (4) the squared deviation of a product's itinerary distance from the average itinerary distance of competing products o¤ered by other airlines; (5) number of other products o¤ered by an airline in a market; and (6) mean number of intermediate stops across products o¤ered by an airline in a market.
As discussed in Gayle (2007 and 2013) , instruments (1)-(5) are motivated by supply theory, which predicts that a product's price and within-group product share are a¤ected by changes in its marginal cost and markup. The number, and closeness in characteristics space, of competing products in the market in ‡uence the size of a product's markup, while a product's itinerary distance is likely to be correlated with its marginal cost. The intuition for instrument (6) is that a passenger may prefer a set of products o¤ered by a particular airline over other airlines.
Reduced-form Routing Quality Equation
We use a reduced-form regression equation of Routing Quality to evaluate e¤ects that each of the two mergers have on routing quality of the merged …rms. A di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy is used to identify possible merger e¤ects on routing quality, i.e., we compare pre-post merger periods changes in routing quality of products o¤ered by the …rms that merge, relative to changes in routing We use the following reduced-form speci…cation of the Routing Quality equation: where DN jmt is a zero-one airline-speci…c dummy variable that takes the value one only for products o¤ered by Delta or Northwest, while T dn t is a zero-one time period dummy variable that takes a value of one only in the DL/NW post-merger period. Considering the entire time span of the data set, 6 , which is the coe¢cient on DN jmt , tells us whether the routing quality of Delta and Northwest products systematically di¤ers from the routing quality of products o¤ered by other airlines. 7 , which is the coe¢cient on T dn t , tells us how routing quality of products o¤ered by airlines other than Delta or Northwest change over the DL/NW pre-post merger periods. On the other hand, 8 , which is the coe¢cient on the interaction variable T dn t DN jmt , tells us if routing quality of products o¤ered by Delta or Northwest changed di¤erently relative to routing quality changes of products o¤ered by other airlines over the DL/NW pre-post merger periods. Therefore, 8 should capture changes in the routing quality of products o¤ered by Delta and Northwest that are associated with the DL/NW merger. Parameters 9 , 10 and 11 are interpreted analogously to 6 , 7 and 8 , but relate to the CO/UA merger. For example, 11 tells us if routing quality of products o¤ered by Continental or United changed di¤erently relative to routing quality changes of products o¤ered by other airlines over the CO/UA pre-post merger periods. Therefore, 11 should capture changes in the routing quality of products o¤ered by Continental and United that are associated with the CO/UA merger.
As mentioned in the data section, N_comp_nonstop measures the number of nonstop products o¤ered by an airline's competitors in the market, while N_comp_connect measures the number of products that require intermediate stop(s) o¤ered by an airline's competitors in the market.
Therefore, these two variables are used to control for the level of product-type-speci…c competition faced by a given product in a market. We also control for the e¤ect of distance between the origin and destination (Nonstop Flight Distance), and also for the size of an airline's presence at the endpoint airports of the market (Origin Presence and Destination Presence). Note that unobserved airline-speci…c (a j ), time period-speci…c ( t ), origin-speci…c (origin m ), and destinationspeci…c (dest m ) e¤ects are controlled for in the reduced-form routing quality regression.
The reduced-form routing quality regression is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
The routing quality equation in (7) can be thought of as a baseline speci…cation. We will subsequently augment the right-hand-side variables to more meticulously investigate predictions from our theoretical model.
Empirical Results

Estimates from Demand Equation
Recall that price and within-group product shares are endogenous variables in the demand equation.
Therefore, OLS estimates of coe¢cients on these variables will be biased and inconsistent. To get a sense of the importance of using instruments for these endogenous variables, Table 4 reports both OLS and 2SLS estimates of the demand equation. The OLS estimates of the coe¢cients on Price and ln S jmtjg are very di¤erent than the 2SLS estimates, in fact the OLS coe¢cient estimate on Price is positive and therefore contrary to standard demand theory. A formal WuHausman statistical test of exogeneity, reported in Table 4 , con…rms the endogeneity of Price and ln S jmtjg . First-stage reduced-form regressions in which Price and ln S jmtjg are regressed on exogenous regressors and the instruments produce R-squared values of 0.36 and 0.59 respectively.
In addition, likelihood ratio tests con…rm the joint statistical signi…cance of the instruments in explaining variations in Price and ln S jmtjg . The evidence therefore suggest that the instruments do explain variations in the endogenous variables.
Given the clear need to instrument for Price and ln S jmtjg , the remainder of our discussion of the demand estimates focuses on the 2SLS estimates. Furthermore, since all coe¢cient estimates are statistically signi…cant at conventional levels of statistical signi…cance, the discussion focuses on the relationship between the measured product characteristic and consumer choice behavior that is implied by the sign of the relevant coe¢cient estimate. 23767.7*** F(2; 647,002) Prob_Value = 0.000 *** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
As expected, an increase in the product's price reduces the probability that the product will be chosen by a typical consumer. The coe¢cient estimate on ln S jmtjg , which is an estimate of , is closer to zero rather than one. This suggests that although consumers do exhibit some loyalty to airlines, their loyalty is not strong.
The larger the size of an airline's operations at the consumer's origin airport, as measured by the Origin Presence variable, the more likely the consumer is to choose one of the products o¤ered by the airline. This result can be interpreted as capturing a "hub-size" e¤ect on air travel demand.
Since airlines typically o¤er better services at their hub airports, such as frequent and convenient departure times, the positive "hub-size" demand e¤ect is consistent with our expectation. The demand model yields a mean own-price elasticity of demand estimate of -1.55. Oum, Gillen and Noble (1986) and Brander and Zhang (1990) argue that a reasonable estimate for own-price elasticity of demand in the airline industry lies in the range of -1.2 to -2.0. Therefore, the mean own-price elasticity estimate produced by our demand model appears reasonable.
Last, the demand model yields mean cross-price elasticity of demand estimates of 0.00025 between Delta and Northwest products, and 0.00033 between Continental and United products during their respective pre-merger periods; the former is smaller than the latter, and the di¤erence is statistically signi…cant. Recall that our theoretical model suggests that the intensity of premerger competition (as measured by cross-elasticity of demand) between merging …rms' products matters for the quality e¤ect of a merger. The empirical analysis in the next subsection veri…es this theoretical prediction. 
Estimates from Reduced-form Routing Quality Equation
.54** (25399.18) R-squared 0.1599 0.1614 0.1617 0.1617 *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, while * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. The equations are estimated using ordinary least squares. Estimation of each regression includes fixed effects for carriers, time periods, origin cities, and destination cities, even though their associated coefficients are not reported in the table.
Estimates of the constant term across the regression speci…cations are approximately 87.6. Therefore, assuming all determinants of routing quality in the regressions are held at zero, the mean routing quality measure across all products in the sample is approximately 87.6. This means that nonstop ‡ight distances between origins and destinations are on average 87.6% of the ‡ight distances associated with product itineraries used by passengers in the sample markets. Of course, this mean routing quality will change with each of the measured routing quality determinants in the regressions. We now examine the impact of each of the measured routing quality determinants.
Impact of Measured Determinants of Routing Quality
Size of an airline's operations at the market endpoint airports, as measured by the Origin Presence and Destination Presence variables, positively impact routing quality of products o¤ered by the airline in the market. In particular, the relevant coe¢cient estimates suggest that for each additional city that an airline connects to either endpoints of a market using nonstop service, routing quality of the airline's products within the market will increase by approximately 0.06%.
The positive coe¢cient estimate on the Nonstop Flight Distance variable suggests that products tend to have higher routing quality the longer the nonstop ‡ight distance between a market's origin and destination. For example, assuming all other determinants of routing quality are equal, the routing quality of products in the New York City to Atlanta market (nonstop ‡ight miles of 761) should be lower than routing quality of products in the New York City to Los Angeles market (nonstop ‡ight miles of 2,469). The sign pattern of the coe¢cient estimates on variables, N_comp_connect and N_comp_nonstop, suggests that a product's routing quality tends to be higher (lower) the larger the number of competing nonstop (intermediate stop(s)) products it faces in the market. To achieve our ultimate goal of properly identifying merger e¤ects on routing quality, it is important to control for the determinants of routing quality discussed above. In addition, given that we will use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences identi…cation strategy, it is also important to control for persistent di¤erences in routing quality across …rms. Such controls are especially important if the routing quality of products o¤ered by the …rms that merge are persistently di¤erent from routing quality of products o¤ered by other …rms in the sample. Without controlling for persistent routing quality di¤erences, we may incorrectly attribute measured di¤erences in routing quality to the merger. As such, we now examine potential persistent routing quality di¤erences across the …rms that merge relative to other …rms in the sample.
Persistent Di¤erences in Routing Quality of Products o¤ered by the Merging Firms
The coe¢cient estimates on dummy variable DN are approximately -13, suggesting that throughout the time span of the data, assuming all determinants of routing quality in the regressions are held constant, the mean routing quality measure of products o¤ered by Delta and Northwest is 13 points less than the mean routing quality measure across all products in the sample. where the numbers in parentheses are means of the regressors for CO/UA products, while the other numbers are the coe¢cient estimates in Speci…cation 1 of the regression model. ‡ight distances between origins and destinations are on average 85.48% of the ‡ight distances associated with Continental/United product itineraries used by passengers. In summary, the evidence suggests that CO/UA products have slightly higher mean routing quality compared to mean routing quality of DL/NW products.
With the controls on routing quality discussed above in place, as well as …xed e¤ects controls for other airlines, time periods, origin cities, and destination cities, we are now in a position to examine the e¤ect of each merger on routing quality.
Overall Routing Quality E¤ects of each Merger
The negative coe¢cient estimate on T dn suggests that the routing quality of products o¤ered by airlines other than Delta or Northwest declined by 0.5% below the sample average over the DL/NW pre-post merger periods, i.e., non-DL/NW itinerary ‡ight distances increased relative to nonstop ‡ight distances by 0.5% over the relevant pre-post merger periods. Interestingly, the negative coe¢cient estimate on the interaction variable T dn DN suggests that routing quality of products o¤ered by the merged Delta/Northwest carrier has an even larger decline of 1% (= 0:541 + 0:464 based on estimates in Speci…cation 1) over the pre-post merger periods. This suggests that the merger may have precipitated an additional 0.5% decline in the routing quality of DL/NW products relative to the routing quality of products o¤ered by other airlines. In essence, the ‡ight distances associated with DL/NW product itineraries increased over convenient nonstop ‡ight distances by an additional 0.5% due to the merger.
The statistically insigni…cant coe¢cient estimate on T cu suggests that the routing quality of products o¤ered by airlines other than Continental and United were unchanged over the CO/UA pre-post merger periods. However, in Speci…cation 1, the coe¢cient estimate on the interaction variable T cu CU suggests that average routing quality of products o¤ered by the merged CO/UA carrier increased by 0.6% over their pre-post merger periods. This suggests that the merger is associated with an increase in routing quality of CO/UA products. In particular, according to estimates in Speci…cation 1, ‡ight distances associated with CO/UA product itineraries fell towards nonstop ‡ight distances by 0.6% due to the merger.
In summary, coe¢cient estimates in Speci…cation 1 suggest that, overall, across all markets in the sample, the CO/UA merger is associated with an increase in routing quality of their products, but the DL/NW merger is associated with a decline in routing quality of DL/NW products.
However, as our theoretical model suggests, these quality e¤ects may di¤er across markets based on certain pre-merger characteristics of a market. We now explore this possibility via model Speci…cations 2, 3, and 4.
Merger E¤ects on Routing Quality based on Existence of Pre-merger Competition between Merging Firms
M KT dn bm is a zero-one market-speci…c dummy variable that takes a value of one only for origindestination markets in which Delta and Northwest competed prior to their merger. Similarly, M KT cu bm is a zero-one market-speci…c dummy variable that takes a value of one only for origindestination markets in which Continental and United competed prior to their merger. These market-speci…c dummy variables are used in Speci…cation 2 of the regression estimates to investigate whether routing quality merger e¤ects di¤er in markets where the merging …rms competed prior to the merger. In our data, Delta and Northwest simultaneously serve 1,730 directional origin-destination combinations prior to their merger, while 735 directional origin-destination combinations are served by either one or the other carrier prior to their merger. However, Continental and United simultaneously serve 1,436 directional origin-destination combinations prior to their merger, while 1,025 directional origin-destination combinations are served by either one or the other carrier prior to their merger.
The merger-speci…c variables in Speci…cation 2 suggest that the DL/NW and the CO/UA mergers are associated with 1% and 5% declines, respectively, in routing quality of products o¤ered by the merging …rms in markets where the merging …rms competed with each other prior to their merger. This evidence comes from the negative coe¢cient estimates of -1.079 and -4.969 on the interaction variables, M KT dn bm T dn DN and M KT cu bm T cu CU respectively. Based on results from our structural demand estimates, we can monetize consumer welfare e¤ects of these routing quality declines associated with the mergers. In particular, recall that our demand estimates suggest that consumers are willing to pay $2.52, on average, for each percentage point increase that the nonstop ‡ight distance is of the actual itinerary ‡ight distance. Since nonstop ‡ight distance between an origin and destination cannot change, then actual itinerary ‡ight distance must fall towards (increase away from) nonstop ‡ight distance so that nonstop ‡ight distance can account for a larger (smaller) percentage of actual itinerary ‡ight distance. Therefore, in markets that the merging …rms competed prior to merger, routing quality e¤ects of the mergers imply that each consumers' utility falls by an average of $2.72 (= $2.52 1.079) in case of the DL/NW merger, and $12.52 (= $2.52 4.969) in case of the CO/UA merger. These consumer welfare e¤ects are not trivial considering that many of these markets in our sample have origin city populations close to or greater than a million, e.g. Chicago, Illinois (one of United Airline's hub city).
Speci…cation 2 coe¢cient estimates on the interaction variables, T dn DN and T cu CU ,
suggest that routing quality of the merging …rms' products actually increase by 0.5% and 5% with the DL/NW and CO/UA mergers, respectively, in markets where the merging …rms did not compete with each other prior to the merger. So each consumer in these markets experienced increases in utility related to routing quality improvements equivalent to $1.26 (= $2.52 0.5) in case of the DL/NW merger, and $12.60 (= $2.52 5) in case of the CO/UA merger.
Merger E¤ects on Routing Quality based on Pre-merger Competition Intensity between Merging Firms
To investigate the theoretical prediction that the e¤ect of a merger on product quality depends on the intensity of pre-merger competition (as measured by cross-elasticity of demand) between products of the merging …rms, we use the demand model that was estimated in the previous section to compute pre-merger cross-price elasticities between Delta and Northwest products, and between
Continental and United products. The variable, E dn bm , measures pre-merger cross-price elasticities of demand between Delta and Northwest products, while variable E cu bm measures pre-merger crossprice elasticities of demand between Continental and United products. The elasticities in each of these variables vary across origin-destination markets in which the merging …rms competed prior to their respective mergers. A cross-price elasticity between the merging …rms' products will only exist in markets where they are competitors prior to the merger.
We use the pre-merger cross-elasticity variables to construct interaction variables:
T cu CU . Speci…cations 3 and 4 in Table 5 incrementally add these variables to the routing quality regression.
The Delta/Northwest merger The segment of the regression equation in Speci…cation 4 that relates to routing quality e¤ects of the Delta/Northwest merger in markets where they directly competed prior to the merger is given by:
Routing Quality dn = 0:866 575:68E dn bm
where dummy variables M KT dn bm , T dn and DN each take the value of 1. Note that all coe¢cient estimates in equation (8) are negative. This suggests that the Delta/Northwest merger decreased routing quality of its products in all markets that the two airlines directly competed in prior to the merger. In addition, consistent with theory, routing quality fell by more in markets where the two airlines competed more intensely (higher E dn bm ) prior to the merger. Given that E dn bm has a mean of 0.00025, a minimum value of 1.52e-07, and a maximum value of 0.0093, equation (8) implies that routing quality of DL/NW products declined by a mean of 1.01%, a minimum of 0.866%, and a maximum of 12.49% across markets in which Delta and Northwest competed prior to their merger. So there exists a market in which a typical consumer experienced a decline in utility equivalent to $31.47 (= $2.52 12.49), due to routing quality declines associated with the DL/NW merger. In fact, Atlanta to Washington, DC; Atlanta to Philadelphia; and Atlanta to San Francisco; are examples of markets in the sample in which E dn bm is greater than 0.008, which implies that a typical consumer in these markets experienced a decline in utility greater than $25 ( $2.52 10) due to routing quality declines associated with the DL/NW merger. 
where dummy variables M KT cu bm , T cu and CU each take the value of 1. Note that the coe¢cient estimate on (E cu bm ) 2 in equation (9) is positive, while the other coe¢cients in the equation are negative. This sign pattern of the coe¢cients in equation (9) suggests an interesting result for the Continental/United merger: the e¤ect of the merger on routing quality varies in a U-shaped manner with pre-merger competition intensity (measured by cross-elasticity) between the two airlines, where the minimum turning point in the U-shaped relationship occurs at a cross-elasticity of 0.0037 (= 389.23/(2 52623.54)). Speci…cally, the merger appears to have decreased routing quality more in markets where the pre-merger cross-elasticities between the two airlines' products are higher, up to an intermediate pre-merger cross-elasticity of 0.0037. Markets with pre-merger cross-elasticity between CO and UA of 0.0037, experienced the largest decline in routing quality of 5.62%, which yields a decline in a typical consumer's utility equivalent to $14.16 (= $2.52 5.62). Examples of origin-destination markets in our sample in which our demand model generates pre-merger crosselasticity between CO and UA of between 0.003 and 0.004 include: (i) Houston to Los Angeles;
(ii) Pittsburgh to Houston; and (iii) Santa Ana, California to New York City/Newark, New Jersey.
However, the decrease in routing quality of Continental/United products becomes smaller with pre-merger cross-elasticity higher than this intermediate cross-elasticity level.
Note that equation (9) can be used to show that routing quality decreased in markets where E cu bm is less than 0:014, but increased in markets where E cu bm is greater than 0:014. However, since the maximum value for E cu bm in our data set is 0:014, there are no markets in which CO and UA directly competed prior to the merger that experienced a routing quality increase of their products.
Last, the coe¢cient on T cu CU in Speci…cation 4 remains positive, suggesting that the positive coordination e¤ect remains the key driver of merger quality e¤ects in markets where Continental and United did not compete prior to their merger.
Summary of Empirical Results of each Merger on Routing Quality
In summary, the empirical results, taken together across both mergers, are consistent with the theoretical predictions. The evidence suggests that each merger increased routing quality of the merging …rms' products -approximately 0.5% and 5% for the DL/NW and CO/UA merger respectively -in markets where the merging …rms did not compete prior to their merger. In these markets, due to the merging …rms' quality improvements, a typical consumer is estimated to experience an increase in utility equivalent to $1.26 and $12.60, respectively for the DL/NW and CO/UA merger.
In contrast, each merger decreased routing quality of the merging …rms' products in markets where they competed prior to their merger, and the magnitude of the quality reductions di¤ered across mergers, depending (non-monotonically in the case of CO/UA) on their competition intensity prior to the merger. For the DL/NW merger, routing quality of the merging …rms declined by a mean of 1.01%, a minimum of 0.866%, and a maximum of 12.49% across such markets. These quality declines are estimated to yield utility decreases of a consumer in these markets ranging from a minimum of $2.18 to as high as $31.47. For the CO/UA merger, the largest decline in routing quality is 5.62%, which yields a decline in a typical consumer's utility equivalent to $14.16.
In general, routing quality declined less severely for the CO/UA merger than for the DL/NW merger. Combined with the evidence that routing quality improvements are larger for the CO/UA merger, as far as quality changes are concerned, a typical consumer apparently fared better under the CO/UA merger than under the DL/NW merger. In fact, overall, across all markets in the sample, the CO/UA merger is associated with an increase, whereas the DL/NW merger is associated with a decrease, in routing quality of the respective products.
Conclusion
An important issue in industrial organization and antitrust is how horizontal mergers a¤ect …rm conduct and market performance. Departing from the extant literature that focuses on the price e¤ects of mergers, this paper has investigated how mergers a¤ect product quality. Empirical analysis of two recent airline mergers …nds that, averaging across all markets, the Delta/Northwest merger is associated with a quality decrease while the Continental/United merger with a quality increase.
However, the quality e¤ects of mergers di¤er greatly between markets: each merger is associated with a quality increase in markets where the merging …rms did not compete prior to their merger, while each merger is associated with a quality decrease in markets where they did. Furthermore, the quality change across markets from the Continental/United merger exhibited a U-shaped curve as the pre-merger competition intensity between the two …rms increased. These …ndings are consistent with the theory that mergers improve coordination but diminish competitive pressure for …rms to provide high quality products.
